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INTRODUCTION:DOES THE CONSTITUTIONGOVERN?
William F. Connelly, Jr. and William Lasser
Guest Editors
A hundred or even 50 years ago, the question "Does the Constitution
Govern?" would have been regarded as a banality hardly worthy of consideration. To traditional political thinkers, the influence of the Constitution on
American politics was a given; the Constitution, as the legal scholar Thomas
Cooley wrote, was nothing less than "that body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised." 1 To
the question "Does the Constitution Govern?" traditional political scientists
would have answered yes, and yawned, and wonder why the question was
even asked.
The behavioralist revolution transformed the political scientist's view of
the Constitution, just as it transformed political science itself. Behavioralism
as applied to political science sought "to explain the phenomena of government
in terms of the observed and observable behavior of people." 2 Such an approach tended to downplay the importance of institutions and ideas, and to
reject abstraction and formalism. One casualty of the behavioralist revolution
was the Constitution of the United States, at least as a major factor in political
scientists' attempts to understand American government and politics. A few
political scientists continued to study constitutional law, but even the public
law subfield was replaced by an emphasis on judicial politics or judicial behavior.
For much of the post-World War II era, American political science has neglected
the Constitution, and many post-war thinkers would have dismissed our inquiry
as a nostalgic but ultimately uninteresting enterprise. Their answer to the
question "Does the Constitution Govern" would have been a simple and flat

"No."
In recent years, however, the role of institutions in general and of the
Constitution in particular has begun once again to attract the attention of
students of American government. An increasing number of political scientists
have found the behavioralist model too restrictive, and of incomplete explanatory value in assessing the larger questions of American politics. In their
attempt to fill in the gaps, these modem thinkers have begun to take the
Constitution seriously, so to speak, but not too seriously. They seek a comprehensive and integrated approach to the study of politics, seeing the Constitution (and institutions in general) as one factor governing our political
system, but not as the only factor. The Constitution governs, in their view,
but it does not govern alone or completely.
At the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, unlike at its centennial or sesquicentennial, the question "Does the Constitution Govern?" is
both timely and relevant to the concerns of a growing number of American
political scientists. This special issue of the Journal of Political Sciencepresents
a number of diverse answers to that question, from a variety of perspectives
and across a range of American political science subfields.
1

I
The rejuvenated interest in institutions in general and in the Constitution in particular is reflected in all areas of American political science, as the
essays in the following pages clearly demonstrate. Certainly one would expect such interest to be generated in fields like public law, and it is; one
can, however, see the impact of this transformation in areas that traditionally neglected the Constitution altogether, such as in the study of inte rest
group politics.
The study of public law, of course, has always been heavily committed
to taking the Constitution seriously. Edward S. Corwin, perhaps the greatest of all public law scholars in this century, devoted an entire book to The
Constitution and What It Means Today; and even in his other books emphasizes constitutional interpretation and formal constitutional principles. The
field of public law at first focused almost exclusively on the constitutional decisions of the courts, and especially the Supreme Court; and on the philosophical and theoretical foundations of those decisions and of the American
constitutional system in general. The titles of even of few of Corwin's essays present the flavor of this early approach to public law: among many
others, he wrote "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional
Law"; "Some Lessons from the Constitution of 1787"; "The Constitution as
Instrument and Symbol"; and "The Impact of the Idea of Evolution on the
American Political and Constitutional Tradition." Whatever else they did,
Corwin and his contemporaries certainly took the Constitution seriously.
The behavioralist revolution, however, did not leave the field of public
law untouched. For a while, in fact, especially in the 1960's, the Constitution threatened to disappear from the field of public law almost entirely.
New approaches seemed more promising and less naive; judicial biography
flourished, as did new initiatives like the analysis of "judicial strategy " and
the quantitative assessment of judicial behavior. Courts and judges were
now conceptualized as political actors creating policy outputs just like their
counterparts in Congress and the presidency; and if congressional or presidential scholars did not find the Constitution of analytical value, why should
public law scholars?
The behavioralist revolution in the field of public law, however, was an
imcomplete one. In the 1980's, the old approach coexists with the new, and
the field, as Lawence Baum put it, "has taken with a vengeance C. Herman
Pritchett's advice to "Let a hundred flowers bloom." 3 Public law scholars
have rediscovered constitutional theory, constitutional interpretatio n, constitutional history, and constitutional law. This newly rediscovere d emphasis
on the Constitution does not assume that the formal study of the Constitution is enough, by itself, to understand the courts; far from it. But it does
regard the Constitution as one of the central elements, and perhaps the central element, in understanding the role of courts and judges .
Nowhere is the new approach to public law more clearly reflecte d than
in the spate of books being published in connection with the Constitution bi2

• 1 Consider only the three discussed by Sue Davis in her review
cente~\his volume; they approach the study of the Constitution from the
e~say Illfields of legal philosophy, history, and traditional constitutional interdiverst~ When books like these can coexist with studies that utilize quantipreta 10n.
. analysis formal modeling, and a host of other approaches, the field of
tat1ve
'
ublic Jaw is surely a healthy and robust one.
_
p
the area of interest groups, to take the second example, the influ1
the new approach has been , if anything, even more dramatic. Durence
.
. d a great dea I of
. the 1950s and 1960s the study of mterest
groups game
~~fention precisely because this relatively. ne:v s_ubfi~ld seemed to _liberate
the political scientist from the confines of mstitutionalism and formalism. As
Graham K. Wilson recently wrote,
Twenty-five years ago, the study of interest groups
seemed likely to be one of the main branches of political
science. The growing awareness of interest groups which
scholars showed could be viewed as one of the most promising developments in the discipline. The study of interest
groups would free political science from the straight jacket
of the study of political institutions and constitutions; interest groups were part of the substance of real politics,
not the arid principles of constitutional law. Above all, the
study of interest groups would bridge the gap between the
study of politics and the study of society .4

:f

Robert Dahl, with his Preface to Democratic Theory and Who Governs?
was at the center of this attempt to move the study and practice of politics
beyond the constraints of the institutional and formalist approach that had
characterized the study of American politics ever since James Madison. Dahl
criticized Madison for fostering an excessive concern with constitutional principles such as the separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and
bicameralism. "The Madisonian argument exaggerates the importance, in preventing tyranny, of specified governmental officials; it underestimates the importance of the inherent social checks and balances existing in every pluralist
society." Dahl took this critique even a step further : "If constitutional factors
are not entirely irrelevent," he concluded, "their significance is trivial as compared with the non-constitutional." Constitutional rules, Dahl wrote, "are not
crucial, independent factors in maintaining democracy; rather, the rules themselves seem to be functions of underlying non-constitutional factors." Madison's
concern with "the proper structure of the Union," according to Dahl, was
excessive because constitutional structure is epiphenomena!. Constitutional
limitations, he insisted, are merely a "Chesire cat." 5
Thirty years later the field of interest group politics appears to be coming
around full circle, as seen for example in a study by Nelson Polsby, one of
Dahl's foremost students. In PoliticalInnovationin America, Polsby returns
modem pluralist theory to the serious consideration of the influence of constitutional principles and structure on the behavior of individuals and groups.
In response to those who argue that the American political system manifests
3

a bias against policy initiation, Polsby argues that the policy process is suffi~iently ?ecentralize~ an~ pe~~able so ~s to allow, and e~en encourage, policy
innovation. Innovation m politics requires that the political system provid
sufficient incentives to policy makers to search for innovations. These incen~
tives, Polsby suggests, are "incorporated into the constitutional routines of
the American political process as they affect the ambitions of politicians _
routines associated with the electoral cycle and routines associated with the
separation of powers." 6 The Constitution, in Polsby's view, establishes a
multicentered, rather than hierarchical, decision-making structure, thus ensuring the .institutionalized competition and conflict of a pluralism bounded by
a decentralized political structure . In Polsby's view, quite clearly, one cannot
simply separate social structure and political structure.
Critics of the pluralist literature over the past few decades also seemed
to depreciate the importance of constitutional structure. In pointing to the
biases of pluralism in theory and practice, elite theorists, for example, often
argue that broad interests, such as consumer or environmental interests, are
not adequately represented by organized interest groups. Indeed, the most
general interest, namely the public interest, is, in their view, the most chronically underrepresented of all.
Madison, were he alive to defend himself, might insist that constitutional
government is itself the organization and articulation of the public interest, as
seen for example, in the principle of representation. An argument can be made
that the constitutional principle of representation, as embodied in the deliberations within Congress and between the President and Congress, provides
the most immediate and tangible expression of the common good. And yet,
pluralist and anti-pluralist theorists alike have labeled such an argument naive,
and have called into question the very nature of representatio n. Implacable
foes on most everything else, on this pluralists and their critics often agree:
an elected representative is more readily the agent or advocate of his particular
group or class interest, and infrequently, not to say never, is he sincerely the
trustee of the public interest. Much of the literature on Congress reflects this
somewhat cynical view. But today we are seeing a reconsideration of the
argument that constitutional government and the principle of re prese ntation
actually mean something.
Arthur Maass, in his new book, Congress and the Common Good, criticizes the pluralist view of the legislative process and attempts to revive the
argument that deliberation in Congress leads to the public interest. How is it,
Maass asks, that according to many pluralist theorists, all interests except the
public interest are knowable and definable? Maass sees the legislative process
as a continuous process of deliberation and discussion about the common good
which refines and enlarges our "breadth of view." The key to this, according
to Maass, is the institutional environment or context. 7
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II
The contributors to this special issue of the Journal of Political Science
offer a variety of answers t? the question "Does_ th_e . C~nstitution ~ove~?"
Th first essay, by Louis Fisher, explores extraJudic1al influences , mcluding
~al ideological, and political factors, on the development of constitutional
OCI ,
.
have a s1"gnfican~ e ffect on
Jaw.
Fisher concludes ~t sue h cons1"derati~ns
h evolution of constitutional law, a conclusion he documents with a range
t r\istorical and modem examples. James W. Ceaser adopts the opposite
~ck , and looks at the effect . of constitutional princi~le~ of political cult~re.
easer examines the connection between our Constitub.on and our constitution and argues that our written Constitution, and the ongoing debate over
the 'principles of that Constitution, continue to inform the development of
our political culture. He concludes that the American constitutional order remains viable because it represents a healthy synthesis of the two traditions
m American politics, namely, the federalist and the antifederalist, or the urban and the rural.
The article by Randall W. Strahan moves out of the realm of high theory to a more practical and particular focus on the Constitution's "originating
clau e" and the role of the constitution in the politics of federal taxation.
trahan asks, in effect, does the originating clause govern? He concludes
that, while the originating clause has not consistently dictated the formation
of tax policy, it generally has been followed throughout our history, and it
may provide a standard worth adhereing to in the future in order to maintain
a measure of stability in tax decisionmaking.
Danny Adkison's article and the essay by Marcia Whicker, Ruth Ann
trickland, and Raymond Moore both raise the question: why has the Contitution survived for two hundred years? Adkison maintains that the Constitution remains viable because the Founders, as students of political
philosophy, based the Constitution on a profound understanding of the connection between human nature and politics. The Constitution survives, according to Adkison, because it is compatible with human nature. Whicker,
trickland, and Moore present an interesting exploratory study which seeks
to explain the constitutional amendment process in terms of two broad
causal models. The constitution governs, they conclude, because it is adaptable.
Finally, Tinsley E. Yarbrough raises the enduring question of the nature of constitutional interpretation within the context of his focus on the interpr tivist jurisprudence of Justice Hugo Black. Yarbrough defends Justice
Black's interpretivism as holding the Constitution up as "higher law," thus
enabling the constitution to govern. The Yarbrough essay, with its examination of the "constitutional faith of Justice Black," provides an appropriate
close to the six essays in this special edition of the Journal of Political Science. All six essays provide different, yet consistently challenging, answers
to the questions: does the Constitution govern? In this bicentennial year it is
fitting and proper that we study the Constitution and wonder at its ability to
endure.
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